(2) It is possible that there is something that exemplifies a property in a world w without being in w (i.e., without having the property of being in w).
(2) is the thesis that transworld property exemplification (TPE) is possible.6 TPE occurs when a property is exemplified in a world w, not by an object that is in w (i.e., has being in w), but by an object that is in another world w*. TPE is to be distinguished from intraworld property exemplification, the exemplification of a property in a world w by an object that is in that same world (this is what we ordinarily think of as property exemplification). More specifically, it is to be distinguished from the sort of intraworld property exemplification which occurs when an object x that is in a world w exemplifies a property in another world w* but does so from w* (since x is-i.e., has being-in w* as well as W).7 Thus, (1) can be a counterexample to serious actualism without also being a counterexample to actualism only if (2), the thesis that TPE is possible, is true.
In light of the above remarks, I am inclined to think that those proposing (1) as a counterexample to serious actualism are taking for granted that TPE is possible. However, given that TPE seems to be a very problematic notion and that neither Fine nor Hinchliff nor Pollock explicitly affirms that TPE is possible, it may appear uncharitable to attribute such an assumption to them. But, regardless of whether or not these philosophers are taking for granted that TPE is possible, they are, in denying that actualism entails serious actualism, committed to the thesis that TPE is possible. For there is a straightforward argument from actualism and the denial of the thesis that TPE is possible to serious actualism. Let us formalize the thesis that TPE is possible as follows: But (6) is the thesis of serious actualism. Thus, unless TPE is possible (i.e., unless (4) is false), actualism entails serious actualism. Those who deny that actualism entails serious actualism are, therefore, committed to the thesis that TPE is possible.
I have shown that those who resist the conclusion that actualism entails serious actualism are committed to the thesis that TPE is possible. I now want to argue that TPE is not possible. Suppose (3), the thesis that TPE is possible, is true. Then there is some world w in which there is an instance of a property p being exemplified but not by anything in w. Now what is true in a possible world is what would be true if that world were actual. Thus, if (3) then (7) (3w) (3p) (It is true in w that there is an instance of p being exemplified but not by anything in w).
From the conjunction of (7) with the truism (8) (w) (It is true in w that there is nothing except what there is in w)
it follows that (9) (3w) (3p) (It is true in w that there is an instance of p being exemplified but not by anything at all). But (9) contradicts (10) Necessarily, every instance of property exemplification is an instance of a property being exemplified by something.
Since (10) is obviously true, (9) is false. And since (3) implies (9), (3) is also false. Thus (4), the denial of the thesis that TPE is possible, is true.
One might try to resist this conclusion by denying that (8) is true. A suggested counterexample to (8) might be (11) (3w) (It is true in w that there is something (i.e., something in another world w*) that is not in w). To sum up, my argument from actualism to serious actualism runs as follows. If (4), the denial of the thesis that TPE is possible, is true and (5), which follows immediately from the thesis of actualism, is true then (6), the thesis of serious actualism, is true. But (4) is true. Therefore, if actualism is true then serious actualism is also true. The false assumption which seems to be responsible for resistance to this conclusion (or at least to which those who resist this conclusion are committed) is (3), the thesis that TPE is possible. And this false assumption appears to be the result of reading 'there is something in another possible world ' 
